I you are trying to be funny, I'm afraid I won't play along to well, as my sense of humor is almost zero percent.
So, I will really appreciate it, that any replies addressed to me from you, in the future, to be done with all seriousness.
With other people, feel free to be as joyful as you want, I'm sure they welcome something to lighten their mood.
Thanks in advance.
Although I find it to be deliciously ironic that a human that had a brain that was composed entirely of ganglia would be regarded legally as a vegetable eligible for planned death, I speak mostly with seriousness.
I am highly interested in the ethical theories of Dr. Carol Gilligan, which you may be familiar with. Under that theory, it is actually quite acceptable if one's behavior is really governed by animal impulses, such as defending the honor of a friend because that person is your friend or having a desire to take care of a baby because the baby is cute.
Of course, Carol was incorrect that this constitutes an altogether "feminist" system of ethics. The reason why she got that impression is that it is difficult for both men and women to apply infrahumanization to a woman, even to themselves (read: rhetoric such as "maternal instinct," "women's intuition," "natural," et al.), in spite of even significant empirical evidence to the contrary (such as a woman really being quite rational to ditch a narcissistic gas lighting bastard of a boyfriend or arrange for his unfortunate untimely demise). While women may benefit economically from such a system of ethics, due to infrahumanization being deemphasized under it, the bottom-line is that to acknowledge that this is a fact is really an outcropping of the same reaction that leads to some societies regarding women as child-like entities that must inherently require being kept under the control and protection of men (read: Saudi Arabian women almost never being allowed to meet men that are not related to them, except when they are being pressured/forced into marrying one that has every intention of not only fucking her, whether she willingly accepts him doing so or not, but also using spousal rape as a method of corporal punishment).
Nevertheless, in instances where I am actually getting along with someone and regard them as friends, I regard it as being perfectly acceptable for me to care about something just because one of my friends does.
On the other hand, whenever someone that I do not regard as a friend demands to have the same level of control over what I think about things, my instinctive inclination is to pugilistically batter him until he stops moving for a while. I have run into many people that believe that I am obligated to care considerably more about their self-righteous opinions than I believe I actually am, and my emotional reaction to it is something that I can only attribute to a rather dramatic amygdala hijack.
en.wikipedia.org
Ideally, I can redirect that amygdala hijack and translate it from a violent rage into an uproarious outburst of highly vocalized mirth directed at their faces.
As an agelast, I suppose that you would not understand this intuitively, but the fact is that a strong amygdala hijack is not easily suppressed, and it must often redirected in order to preserve a sense of law and order and thereby avert physical altercation.
My relatively mirthful approach to discussing this matter with you was merely a method of dealing with the fact that I actually am highly annoyed at you people's insistent anti-carnivorous outlook, but the fact of the matter is that I end up getting along extremely well with many vegans. It therefore actually does matter to me what they think about my dining habits. Since it is extremely important to you, I have chosen to be open-minded about slowly starting to tweak my dining habits.
However, it may give you gratification that, now that I have actually tried more non-tetrapodal dietary alternatives, I actually have decided that I find them to be acceptable as substitutes, and come to think of it, the entire process of raising a tetrapodal organism only to slaughter it for its meat strikes me as rather uncouth when I have perfectly acceptable, sometimes even preferable, alternatives readily at hand.
The outcome is, therefore, that I actually am sort of starting to see meat as being, in a way, beneath me, so how I got there should not make all that much of a difference.
Of course, the initiation of that set of thought processes suggests that I actually do have ethical motives besides those that were studied by Carol Gilligan, which constitutes an interesting observation.